The Balkans’ New Strategic Vacuum: Energy, Defence and the Retreat of Democracy

I attended the Balkan Dialogue 2026 meeting in Belgrade between 2 and 6 June. At first glance, the gathering looked like a familiar regional dialogue platform, bringing together diplomats, energy specialists, academics, media representatives and experts dealing with military-political affairs. Yet the content of the discussions and the profile of the participants pointed to something more significant: the Balkans are once again becoming one of the key arenas of great-power and middle-power competition. Energy security, military-political alignments, new technologies in security, media narratives and regional resilience were treated as separate themes, but in reality they all converged around the same question: is a new strategic vacuum emerging in the Balkans, and if so, who is positioned to fill it?

This question matters because the old assumptions about the region no longer hold. The European Union remains formally committed to enlargement, but enlargement fatigue, internal political divisions, economic fragility and the security pressures generated by the war in Ukraine have reduced its strategic energy in the region. The United Kingdom, after Brexit, still seeks diplomatic visibility, but it is no longer part of the old European integration architecture. The United States remains influential, but its attention is divided between Iran, China, Ukraine, Israel-Palestine and its own domestic polarisation. The result is not the disappearance of the West from the Balkans, but a more fragmented and less disciplined regional order in which multiple actors can operate simultaneously.

Russia’s Reduced Capacity, Continued Influence

One of the mistakes often made in Western discussions is to assume that Russia’s war in Ukraine has automatically removed Moscow from the Balkan equation. This is not the case. Russia’s capacity has certainly been constrained. Its military, economic and diplomatic resources are heavily absorbed by Ukraine, while Western sanctions have narrowed its room for manoeuvre. Moscow is no longer able to project influence in the Balkans with the same ease it once enjoyed.

Yet Russia remains an important actor, especially through Serbia, the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Orthodox networks, energy dependency, media ecosystems and anti-Western narratives. Russian power in the Balkans today is less about direct domination and more about disruption, memory, symbolism and selective leverage. It does not need to control the region to remain relevant; it only needs to complicate Western strategies, sustain pro-Russian constituencies and preserve enough influence to ensure that the Balkans cannot be fully stabilised without taking Moscow into account.

Energy remains central to this influence. Even though Europe has tried to reduce its dependence on Russian energy since the invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s energy presence has not completely disappeared from Southeast Europe. Gas corridors, supply vulnerabilities, nuclear energy discussions and infrastructure dependencies continue to shape the strategic choices of Balkan states. For some governments in the region, energy is not only an economic issue, but also a matter of political alignment, regime stability and bargaining power.

China’s Quiet but Durable Expansion

If Russia remains a familiar actor, China represents a different kind of challenge. Beijing’s influence in the Balkans is not primarily military or ideological; it is economic, infrastructural and energy-oriented. China enters the region through ports, highways, railways, power plants, mining projects, loans and construction contracts. Infrastructure investments in Serbia, the Belgrade-Budapest railway, the controversial highway project in Montenegro, energy and industrial investments in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and broader connectivity projects linked to the Belt and Road Initiative all show that Beijing sees the Balkans not simply as a small and fragmented market, but as a logistical gateway into Europe, the western edge of the Belt and Road, and a space where influence can be built around the margins of the EU.

China’s power is often quiet, but it is durable. Unlike the EU, Beijing does not lecture governments on democracy, human rights or the rule of law. It offers investment, loans, infrastructure and speed. For Balkan governments tired of slow accession processes and in need of external financing, this is attractive. The political price is often less visible at the beginning: debt dependency, weak transparency, environmental concerns, opaque procurement and long-term strategic vulnerability. The Chinese model is therefore appealing precisely because it avoids the language of political conditionality. It does not ask Balkan states to become more democratic; it asks them to become more connected, more financed and more dependent on infrastructure networks in which China plays a central role.

Energy and Defence before Democracy

This creates a difficult environment for the EU and its partners. If Western actors speak mainly the language of reform while others provide roads, railways, energy projects and defence cooperation, many Balkan governments will naturally hedge. They will take democracy language from Brussels, security guarantees from NATO where available, energy from Russia where necessary, infrastructure from China where useful, and defence cooperation from whichever actor offers practical gains.

This is why the current Balkan moment is uncomfortable. The region’s political future is increasingly being shaped not by the language of democratisation, but by energy security and defence cooperation. The war in Ukraine, uncertainty around Iran and the growing instability of the wider international order have made Balkan governments more sensitive to security, supply chains, borders, military technology and strategic infrastructure. Defence cooperation is becoming more important across the region. Some states look to NATO and Western suppliers. Others keep channels open with Russia or diversify their partnerships. Turkey has also become more visible through its defence industry, especially drones, armoured vehicles, military training and security partnerships. Yet Turkey is only one part of a broader pattern. The real shift is that the Balkans are moving from a post-Cold War reform agenda to a harder security agenda.

This is not good news for democratic development. When energy security, defence procurement, infrastructure finance and great-power competition dominate the conversation, governance reforms lose urgency. Leaders who can offer stability, security cooperation or access to investment often face less pressure on democratic standards. External actors, too, become more cautious. They may criticise democratic backsliding, but they also prioritise access, routes, bases, energy corridors and diplomatic leverage. This does not mean that democracy and human rights have disappeared from the Balkans. Civil society remains active, independent media still matter, and many citizens continue to aspire to accountable government and European standards. But at the level of regional geopolitics, the current moment is not favourable to a democratic breakthrough. The incentives are moving in another direction.

A Region No Longer Waiting for Europe

The Balkans are entering a period in which power will be measured less by normative influence and more by infrastructure, energy, military technology and strategic patience. Russia remains influential despite its constraints. China is expanding quietly through investment and connectivity. Western actors are present but distracted and internally divided. Regional governments are learning to navigate this fragmented environment through hedging rather than alignment.

The most important conclusion from Belgrade is therefore sobering: the Balkans are not simply waiting for Europe. They are being actively reshaped by competing external actors, hard security concerns and infrastructure politics. In such a climate, speaking about democracy and human rights is necessary, but not sufficient. For now, the region’s agenda is being written elsewhere: in energy corridors, defence partnerships, media narratives, infrastructure projects and the strategic vacuum left by a distracted West.